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Abstract
Entry regulations a¤ecting professional services such as pharmacies are
common practice in many European countries. We assess the impact of en-
try regulations on prots estimating a structural model of entry using the
information provided by a policy experiment. We use the case of di¤erent
regional policies governing the opening of new pharmacies in Spain to show
that structural models of entry ought to be estimated with data from policy
experiments to pin down how entry regulations change payo¤s functions of
the incumbents. Contrary to the public interest rationales, regulations are
not boosting only small town pharmacies payo¤s nor increasing all pharma-
cies payo¤s alike. The gains from regulations are very unevenly distributed,
suggesting that private interests are shaping the current mix of entry and
markup regulations.
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1. Introduction
While regulations that restrict the entry of new rms into a market by xing the
number of rms that can supply that particular market are common in industries
such as nance (e.g., banking and insurance), transport (e.g., taxis and buses),
retailing (e.g., supermarkets, alcohol and tobacco) and the professions (e.g., phar-
macists and solicitors), in Europe there is an on-going discussion as to whether
these entry restrictions serve public interests or whether they benet private in-
cumbents. At the same time a growing body of literature has begun to assess
the impact of these restrictions and their appropriateness with regard to the aims
they pursue.
In many European countries it is common practice that the entry regulations
restricting the number of pharmacies in a given geographic area are particularly
stringent. ÖBIGs report (2006) for the European Commission revealed that 17
out of 25 EU Member States operate entry restrictions1, a situation that contrasts
markedly with that in the US and Canada where no restrictions are operative.
Furthermore, European entry restrictions are typically coupled with price or retail
margin regulations.2
In the case of pharmacies, it might be argued that it is in the public in-
terest to increase the prots of small-town pharmacies (marginal outlets), while
attempts should be made to avoid the excessive entry of pharmacies downtown
(infra-marginal outlets). In this case, regulations should seek only to raise the
revenues of small-town pharmacies.
Alternatively, it might also be argued that it is in the public interest to raise the
prots of all pharmacies. In this case, regulatory quasi-rents should be designed
so as to pay pharmacists for public services produced jointly with private services.
Pharmacists produce positive externalities when in the role of gatekeepers they
curb the non-desired use of medicines in the sense described by Kraakman (1986)
and Arruñada (2006). Here, regulation may serve as the policy instrument to
increase prots like a tide that raises all boats.
Or, private interests might pursue competition restrictions that ensure phar-
1In most state members, the establishment of new pharmacies is restricted on geographic and
demographic criteria. Only in the UK and the Netherlands entry is restricted by the contracts
with the tax-funded health care organizations. Mossialos and Mrazek (2003) also report that
entry is restricted in Norway.
2ÖBIG (2006) reported to the European Commission that 18 out of 25 Member States set the
pharmacy markups by regulation and discounts are not allowed, while the other 7 set maximum
markups or fees for servicies while allowing for free discounts to customers.
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macists obtain excess prots or pure regulatory rents. However, the European
Commission has initiated infringement proceedings against countries that oper-
ate overly tight entry and ownership regulations on the grounds that restricting
freedom of establishment is neither the adequate nor the proportional policy for
serving public interest.3
The aim of this paper is to examine the particular case of recent regional pol-
icy changes in regulations restricting the entry of pharmacies in Spain to assess
their impact on the equilibrium number of pharmacies and payo¤s. Static entry
models such as that developed by Schaumans and Verboven (2008) can be esti-
mated by taking into account the fact that entry is restricted by the government.
However, structural estimates of payo¤s and competitive interactions obtained ex-
clusively from a regulated market are incapable of identifying structural changes
in equilibrium behavior before and after deregulation.
Here, however, we show how policy experiments actually help bail out the
structural approach and we demonstrate that estimating a structural model using
data from regulated and deregulated markets is a suitable way to avoid bias in the
counterfactuals. Specically, we compare the case of a Spanish region (Navarra),
which underwent a change of policy from restricted entry to free entry in 2000,
with that of other regions in which severe entry restrictions continue to be applied.
We nd that restrictions have reduced entry by as much as 71%. And that
deregulation has markedly reduced the scale of the outlets so that as many as
a third of the pharmacies would not have entered the market if the outlets had
maintained the same scale as before deregulation.
Additionally, we nd that geographic entry regulations cannot be compared to
an incoming tide that raises all boats since entry restrictions increase the payo¤s of
the pharmacies in some municipalities, while reducing payo¤s in others, especially
in the least populated municipalities.
Therefore, attempts to reform entry regulations might prove di¢ cult since the
incumbents that occupy the upper tail of the distribution and who gain most from
the restrictions will be willing to invest heavily in lobbying so as to avoid policy
reforms. Any assessment of the impact of these regulations on welfare is beyond
the scope of this current paper, although this question undoubtedly merits further
research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the
3The European Commission has initiated infringement proceedings against the legislation
on ownership and establishment of pharmacies in Austria, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Italy,
Portugal and Spain (European Commission 2008).
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previous literature conducted in this eld. Section 3 describes policy changes in
the geographic areas of analysis, which enable us to assess the impact of regulations
across di¤erent regional jurisdictions. Section 4 outlines the entry model that we
use in our empirical analysis. Section 5 presents and discusses the results obtained
from our estimation of the entry model. Section 6 simulates free-entry policy
counterfactuals. Section 7 presents our concluding remarks.
2. Literature Review
There is a large body of empirical literature examining the e¤ects of pricing,
quality and entry regulations on the provision of services. In a seminal paper,
Eckard Jr. (1985) showed that restricting entry into the car retailing business
creates articial scarcity rents for existing dealers, which are reected in higher
prices for new cars. Valletti et al. (2002) concluded that the regulatory tools
of uniform pricing and coverage constraints as applied in the telecommunications
market are not competitively neutral. They also showed that they may have
far-reaching strategic e¤ects and a varying impact on the achievement of public
service aims. Further, Klapper et al. (2006) found that costly entry regulations
can hamper the creation of new rms, especially in industries that should naturally
have high entry. These regulations also force new entrants to be larger and cause
incumbent rms in naturally high-entry industries to grow more slowly.
This paper is conducted in line with a tradition in the empirical literature that
can be traced back to the entry models devised by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990 and
1991), and subsequent papers by Gri¢ th and Harmgart (2006), Moreno, Puig
and Borrell (2007), and Schaumans and Verboven (2008). In so doing we seek
to demonstrate the importance of estimating the drivers of entry by taking into
consideration entry regulations.
Entry models have been used to assess a closely related question: whether
prices and entry are optimal in equilibrium in markets with product or location
di¤erentiation. The theory remains ambiguous as to whether there is scope for
welfare enhancing pricing, quality and entry regulations. Chamberlains (1933) ex-
cess entry theory, subsequently generalized by Suzuma and Kiyono (1986), shows
that entry is excessive whenever transportation costs are high and economies of
scale are large. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) set the conditions under which free
entry is socially ine¢ cient in oligopolistic markets. The key issue is to estimate
whether new entrants to an industry add more to the consumer surplus entering
the market than they reduce the prots to incumbents by taking their business
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from them.
Berry and Waldfogel (1999) and Davis (2006a and 2006b) were the rst to
employ an entry model for assessing the e¢ ciency of free entry, and reported
excessive entry in the radio broadcasting and the motion picture exhibition in-
dustries, respectively. By contrast, Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2006) reported
too little entry in the ATM industry, and a lack of geographical coverage or pene-
tration. In the case of pharmacies, Watersson (1993) reporting in Melbourne and
Janson (1999) in Spain showed empirically that free entry leads to excessive entry,
and that price regulation might mitigate the problem.
When adding quality of service to the problem, Nuscheller (2003) showed,
using a vertical and horizontal product di¤erentiation model, that under linear
price regulation there is excessive entry but optimum quality in equilibrium when
governments cannot commit to a price prior to rms entry decisions. In this
instance, price regulation is required in order to ensure an optimal level of quality,
and another regulation such as entry restrictions are required to attain the optimal
level of entry.
However, it can prove especially di¢ cult to set the right prices and entry
restrictions when demand is heterogeneous. As Waterson (1993) pointed out an
overly generous price regulation can lead to a larger number of pharmacies than
the market would allow in a situation of free entry. And, furthermore, entry
regulations can result in insu¢ cient entry.
The question then as to whether regulations are getting the pricing and the
amount of entry right needs to be assessed case by case. And in conducting this
assessment it is essential to get the counterfactual right. As Pakes (2007) pointed
out, the typical role of counterfactuals in industrial organization is to evaluate
alternative policy scenarios, i.e., to answer the question as to what would happen
if a regulation were changed. But today the emphasis lies more on estimating
models that are able to approximate what might happen in an environment that
has never actually been observed.
We are therefore interested in assessing whether experimental data can help us
improve the counterfactuals from static entry models. Structural models allow us
to pin down some of the primitives of the entry model, while the experimental data
should allow us to determine whether the payo¤ functions change with regulation.
A large number of studies in economics have been conducted based on natural
experiments or quasi-experiment designs to examine outcome measurements for
observations in treatment groups and comparison groups. Meyer (1995) described
the strengths and weaknesses of using quasi-experiments in economics, but among
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the good natural experiments he cites those induced by policy changes, as they
allow a researcher to obtain exogenous variation in the main explanatory variables.
Besley and Case (2000) explored the use of di¤erent methods for estimating
the incidence of policies in situations where there was a concern about policy
endogeneity. Symeonidis (2000 and 2007) showed the utility of policy reforms for
comparing outcomes before and after the introduction of laws, specically the law
prohibiting cartels in the UK in the late 1950s.
Regional changes in pharmacy entry regulations in Spain provide us with just
such an experimental setting in which policy changes were both unexpected and
unwanted, as we shall see in the section below.
3. Background on the policy change
Entry regulations for pharmacies in Spain date back to the early 20th century. In
1904, the government ruled that local governments should guarantee the existence
of at least one pharmacy for every 2,000 inhabitants so as to attend to the needs of
the poor. This was a typical public service obligation whereby local governments
had to contract-out to one pharmacist certain specied retail pharmacy services
for the poor.4
It was not until 1941 that the government restricted the number of pharmacies.
The new law ruled that there should be no more than one pharmacy for every
5,000 inhabitants in each municipality.5 It also laid down minimum distance
requirements.6 These entry restrictions were coupled with linear regulated mark-
ups for pharmacies.7 Entry restrictions have changed little since then. The current
4Pure licensing regulations and restrictions whereby only pharmacists can own pharmacies
that open to the public and the one-pharmacy per pharmacist rule go back to 1860. In Spain
chemists competed with pharmacists as outlets authorized to sell the new industrial medicines
from the mid-19th century to 1931. See the detailed account of the confrontations between phar-
macists and chemists in Rodríguez-Nozal and González-Bueno (2005). Pharmacists eventually
won the exclusivity right for selling medicines with the support from the upstream industrial
producers of medicines.
5One pharmacy for every 10,000 inhabitants in municipalities with a population greater than
50,000 inhabitants.
6New pharmacies could only open 250 meters away from existing ones in cities larger than
100,000 inhabitants, 200 meters away in cities with between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants and
150 meters away in cities with between 5,000 and 50,000 inhabitants.
7Retail price maintenance was imposed by the government in 1928 as retail and industrial
pharmacists complained about the discounts o¤ered in the chemistsoutlets, while government
regulations capping the markups on industrial medicines date back to 1945, fourteen years after
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Spanish legislation regulating the establishment of new pharmacies, introduced in
1997, xes a ratio of one pharmacy per 2,800 inhabitants in each health care
zone.8 A health care zone is a part of a municipality or group of municipalities in
which there should be at least one public, National Health System (NHS), primary
health care center.9 The minimum distance between pharmacies is xed at 250
meters, while the regulated mark-up was xed at 27.9% of the retail price.
In 2000, the Parliament of the Foral Community of Navarra, a small region in
the North of Spain, with just over 600,000 inhabitants, challenged these national
entry restrictions. Navarra passed a law which reverted to a regulation of minima,
i.e., the regional government allowed new pharmacies to be opened and sought to
ensure that there was at least one pharmacy in each health care zone.
The policy shift in Navarra can be seen as a natural experiment, since it was
unexpected and unwanted. In fact, the sponsor of the legislative proposal, the
regions Health Minister, was a doctor whose original intention was to obtain
discounts from pharmacies in the distribution of medicines prescribed by doctors
working in the public sector. Paradoxically, pharmacy mark-ups are xed by
Spains central government, while health care is fully managed by the regions.
The aim of Navarras Health Minister was to license the new pharmacies un-
der a new contract with the regional government, under whose terms they would
have to give discounts to the NHS. During the attempts to introduce the bill, con-
frontations between the regional government and the pharmacists were frequent
and acrimonious. The pharmacists even took strike action, and public health care
centers were exceptionally given judicial permission to dispense medicines during
the strike action. The new legislation was nally introduced by the regional par-
liament, coming into force late in the year 2000. Consequently, a considerable
number of new pharmacies started trading in 2001.
The new regulation guarantees that there is at least one pharmacy per health
care zone, a global maximum for the region so as to avoid region wide excessive
entry (though this is still not binding), and a minimum distance of 150 meters
the retail pharmacists became the exclusive providers of industrial medicines.
8An additional pharmacy can be established whenever the population of the health zone
is 2,000 people larger than the number resulting from multiplying the number of pharmacies
already open to the public by 2,800. Therefore, a municipality needs a population of 2,800
inhabitants to obtain the permit for the rst pharmacy, 4,800 for the second, 7,600 for the third,
and 10,400 for the fourth and so on.
9Zones vary in population size. For instance, the median health care zone is around 6,100
inhabitants in one region of Spain (Navarra in 2000), while it is 24,000 in another (Andalusia in
2008).
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between incumbent and new businesses. By contrast, the other regions of Spain
have continued to adhere, more or less, to the national mandate, which prevails
in those cases where the region has not specically legislated.
The legal dispute eventually reached the Constitutional Court in 2004, where it
was held that the regional government was respecting the provisions laid down by
the constitution and Spains pharmacies law regarding the duty of guaranteeing
a fair geographic coverage of pharmaceutical services albeit by adopting a less
interventionist approach. The situation was held to be consistent with EU policy
of only maintaining trade and professional regulations that are necessary, adequate
and proportional to the public aim they pursue.
Between 2000 and 2006, the number of pharmacies in Navarra doubled. In
this paper, we seek to infer the impact of entry regulations on payo¤s and the
services geographic reach by comparing the establishment of new pharmacies in
Navarra, where entry is was deregulated although location was not, and the open-
ing of pharmacies in two other Spanish regions in which stringent entry regulations
remained in force.10
Our control regions are Euskadi and Andalusia. Euskadi is in the north of
Spain, and is o¢ cially named the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country.
It has around 2 million inhabitants. Euskadi has one of the most restrictive
policies regarding the opening of new pharmacies. The entry regulation in Euskadi
allows at most one pharmacy per 3,200 inhabitants in large municipalities, one per
2,800 inhabitants in intermediate municipalities and one per 2,500 inhabitants in
small municipalities. Further, pharmacies in municipalities with fewer than 800
inhabitants are not authorized at all.
The other control region, Autonomous Community of Andalusia, is in the
south of Spain. It has around 8 million inhabitants. Since 2003, Andalusia has
allowed the free opening of the rst pharmacy in any town or suburb. But, the
establishment of a second, and subsequent, pharmacies is restricted to comply
with the regulation whereby the total number of pharmacies cannot be greater
than one per 2,800 inhabitants. The law in Andalusia is as restrictive as that
practiced in Euskadi, except in large tourist towns, since here it is not only the
registered population that is taken into account, but also tourist accommodation
and second homes.
10A new law restricting entry again in Navarra has just benn passed late 2008, although the
new entry restriction is much softer than in other regions: the openning of the rst pharmacy
in any municipality is free, while the second and further pharmacies can only be opened if
population per pharmacy reaches 700 inhabitants.
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4. The entry model
To estimate the parameters underlying entry decisions, we use the entry model à
la Bresnahan and Reiss (1990 and 1991) where entry decisions taken by potential
entrants are strategic substitutes as proposed by Schaumans and Verboven (2008)
for studying the markets for pharmacies subject to entry restrictions. This paper
was the rst to take into account geographic entry restrictions when estimating the
parameters for an empirical entry model, and also the strategic complementarities
between the entry of pharmacies and doctors.
In static models of this type, inferences are drawn about unobserved pay-
o¤s from the equilibrium relationship between the observed market structure and
market characteristics such as market size and protability.11
The literature here begins by considering that entry is primarily related to
demand drivers, such as the size and protability of di¤erent markets, to variable
and xed cost shifters, and to competition e¤ects.12
In this present paper, we assume that there is only one type of rm (pharmacy)
with a large pool of potential entrants for each local market.13 Health care centers
are public facilities set up by the regional government according to social needs.
Thus, we consider them to be xed when pharmacy entry decisions are taken in
each local market.
Following Schaumans and Verboven (2008), we assume that the total number of
rms entering each local market is a random variable N: Equilibrium realizations
of this random variable are denoted by n. Firms are subject to an entry restriction
in any local market when N  n. This is the case when in any local market there
cannot be more than n rms. If N < n, the entry restriction is not binding in
equilibrium; by contrast, when N = n the entry restriction is binding.
Firms are identical and have the same payo¤ functions. If a rm does not
enter, it has zero payo¤s. If a rm enters, its payo¤s depend on the total number
11Reviews of the fundamentals of static models of this type can be found in Reiss and Wolak
(2005) and in Berry and Reiss (2007). Dynamic entry models have been developed more recently
and are reviewed by Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007).
12Di¤erent papers use di¤erent demand drivers and cost shifters: see Reiss and Spiller (1989),
Morrison and Winston (1990), Bresnahan and Reiss (1990 and 1991), Berry (1992), Joskow et
al. (1994) and Dresner et al. (2002).
13The ownership of any single pharmacy is restricted to licensed pharmacists. Each pharmacist
can only own one pharmacy, so there is not chain e¤ects. But licensing does not limit the number
of potential entrants as only around a third of the members of the professional associations of
licensed pharmacists currently own a pharmacy in Spain, and less than half of these owned a
pharmacy in Navarra after deregulation.
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of entering rms:
(N) = (N)  "; (4.1)
where (N) is the deterministic component of payo¤s, and " is a random
component, unobserved to the econometrician. The nature of the competitive
interaction conditions the precise relationship between the deterministic compo-
nent of payo¤s and the number of rms. In entry models of this type, the main
assumption is that entry decisions by rms are strategic substitutes: when one
rm decides to enter, the payo¤s from the entry of another rm decrease. That
is, payo¤s from entering the market decrease with a rise in the number of rms.
(N + 1) < (N) (4.2)
Payo¤s decrease with respect to the number of simultaneous entrants. This
assumption is plausible and consistent with this type of entry literature, and is
key to characterizing the Nash equilibrium outcomes.
When entry restrictions are not binding, N < n, each rm freely decides
whether or not to enter, given the entry decisions of the other rms. There is a
large number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this entry game. Bresnahan and
Reiss (1990) resolved this problem by aggregating the non-unique Nash equilib-
rium outcomes into a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous or sequential game.14
Any observed market conguration n is a Nash equilibrium outcome if and
only if the random component of payo¤s, "; satises the following condition:
(N + 1) < "  (N): (4.3)
When this condition is satised, n rms nd protable to enter the market,
and no additional rm has an incentive to enter, therefore N is shown to be a
Nash equilibrium outcome. The assumption that the deterministic component of
payo¤s decreases with the number of rms guarantees that there are realizations of
" for which this condition holds, so there is a positive probability for all outcomes
in case the error term has full support.
14Alternatively, equilibrium selection mechanisms should be assumed to construct the likeli-
hood function. Bajari et al. (2006) allowed the data to show which equilibrium is selected by
the data. However, as stated by Draganska et al. (2008) counterfactuals nevertheless require
the solution and selection of the model equilibrium. Aguirregabiria and Ho (2006) proposed a
method to obtain a linear approximation of the counterfactual choice probabilities. Estimating
such static game models with rm specic information is left for further research. See Berry
and Reis(2007) recent survey on the estimation of such models.
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Assuming that " has a density function f(), the probability that market con-
guration n will be observed as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome when entry
restrictions are not binding is the following:
Pr(N = n) =
Z (n)
(n+1)
f(u)du  P (n): (4.4)
We observe i = 1; 2:::I local markets in which a number of rms have decided
simultaneously or sequentially to enter. The log likelihood function related to the
probabilities of observing a particular market conguration ranging from no entry
(n = 0) to entry by more than 4 rms (n = 4+), is just the following:15
l = P (n = 0) + P (n = 1) + P (n = 2) + P (n = 3) + P (n = 4+): (4.5)
We specify the density f() as a normal density that leads us to estimate the en-
try model as an ordered probit model like those estimated by Bresnahan and Reiss
(1990 and 1991) and many others. Following Genovese (2001) and Schaumans and
Verboven (2008), we dene a rms payo¤s as i (N) = Vi(N) exp( i) Fi(N) 
0 where Vi(N) is variable prots, Fi(N) is xed costs, and i is a multiplicative
error term capturing unobserved market-specic variable prots. Firms enter if
and only if i (N)  0, or equivalently if and only if
i (N) = ln [Vi(N)=Fi(N)]  i  0: (4.6)
That is, a rms payo¤s i (N) are the log of the variable prots over the xed
costs ratio. As stated by Schaumans and Verboven (2008), this interpretation
di¤ers from Bresnahan and Reiss(1991) where payo¤s are modeled directly as
prots. The following linear specication allows us to explain the latent variable,
rms payo¤s, as a function of market variables that a¤ect the log of the variable
prot to the xed costs ratio:
i (N) =  ln(Si) +
X
k
kX
k
i   j   i: (4.7)
Variable S is market size, measured by the population of each market, Xk
are k di¤erent other observed market characteristics that drive each market prof-
itability,  and k are the parameters that show the impact of observed market
15As the probability of observing ve or more rms is very small, we aggregated them within
the four or more category.
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characteristics on the log of the variable prots over the xed costs ratio, and the
parameters j are xed e¤ects when there are j rms in the market.
As we estimate the model including a constant term, these xed e¤ects are the
"cut-o¤ values" in this simple ordered probit where the cut-o¤ value for the one
entrant market structure is set at zero (1 = 0): The xed e¤ects j measure the
competition e¤ect of j rms on the average entrants payo¤s (simultaneous game)
or last entrants payo¤s (sequential game).
As in Schaumans and Verboven (2008), we allow the competition xed e¤ects
to be non-linear with respect to N : given that competition is highly localized and
that location is not free, we expect the rst competitor to be a¤ected by average
payo¤s more strongly than the second and third ones.
Also, as in Schaumans and Verboven (2008), to estimate the model we restrict
the standard deviation of  so that it is equal to one. As is common in discrete
choice models, the scale of the payo¤s is not identied. We are estimating a
standard ordered probit model in which  v N(0; 1). Subsequently, we will add
an additional structure to the payo¤s so as to identify the scale of these payo¤s.
We can estimate the model separately for the restricted entry region-years
(Navarra before deregulation, Euskadi and Andalusia), and also for Navarra after
deregulation. We can also pool the data. By pooling we are able to identify
whether there are any di¤erences in the payo¤ function in the restricted region-
years (control group) with respect to the free entry region (treatment region).
Denoting  the policy indicator where  = f when entry is free and  = r when
entry is restricted, we allow the parameters of the payo¤ function to depend on
the regulatory policy:
i (N) = 
 ln(Si) +
X
k
kX
k
i   j   i:
In the pooled estimation we are able to identify whether deregulation changes
the primitives of the entry models: the parameters that show the impact of the
demand drivers, the cost shifters, and the competition e¤ects on payo¤s, that is
on the log ratio of variable prots over xed costs.16
16All j should be positive and the model is internally consistent if 
j+1
 > 
j
:As in Euskadi
in 2006, entry restrictions are always binding in markets with more than 4 pharmacies, and as in
the other region-years there are very few markets of 5 or more pharmacies, we follow Schaumans
and Verboven (2008) and restrict j so that there is no further competitive entry e¤ect for
j > 4 : j = 
j 1
 + 
 ln((N   1)=N):
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From the estimates of the model, we can compute the implied population
thresholds for di¤erent market structures: Sj = exp
  Pk kXk + j = :The
free-entry thresholds will di¤er from the entry-restricted thresholds if k; 
 or
j di¤er for  = f and  = r.
Using the estimates from the model, we can then also simulate policy counter-
factuals. We can estimate what should be the reduction in regulated mark-ups in
the free-entry counterfactual to keep the number and distribution of pharmacies
equal to those in the restricted entry scenario. The di¤erence in mark-ups is then
our best estimate of the overcharges that patients and insurers (taxpayers) are
paying for their current pharmaceutical coverage.
As in Schaumans and Verboven (2008), to account for the reduced regulated
mark-ups, we adjust the estimated intercept 0 downwards by an amount  ln();
where 0   1 refers to a given reduction in the net mark-ups. As we only have
information regarding gross mark-ups (here 27.9%), but we have no information
about variable retail costs, we cannot compute the e¤ect of an absolute reduction
in regulated gross mark-ups.
Following Schaumans and Verboven (2008), we assume that variable prots
are the following:
V (N) =  R(N)  S; (4.8)
where R(N) are revenues per population head. That is, we make the fol-
lowing two assumptions that seem reasonable for pharmacies: net mark-ups 
are constant across markets, the variable prots per population head are inde-
pendent of the number of consumers S; and any di¤erences across markets are
captured by di¤erences in the log of the variable prots per head on xed costs,
ln(R(N)=F (N)) = 

kX
k
i   j   i : In this new specication we allow the error
term  to have a more general normal distribution with unknown standard devi-
ation:  v N(0; ). So  = . And substituting this into the payo¤s, we
obtain:
i (N) = ln(Si) + ln+ 

kX
k
i   j   i ; (4.9)
and dividing by ;
i (N) =
i (N)

=
1

ln(Si) +
ln

+


k

Xki  
j

  i: (4.10)
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Comparing this expression of a rms payo¤s with the previous one, the addi-
tional structure links the coe¢ cients of the two specications so that  = 1=
and that 0 = (

0 + ln)=
:The estimates of  identify the standard deviation
of i : 
. And, the intercept 0 contains the net mark-up . For a di¤erent
pharmacy mark-up such as ; the intercept in the rst specication would bee0 = (0 + ln)=:And then, adjusting the mark-up is equal to adjusting the
intercept by e0   0 = ln= =  ln:
Here, we assume that variable retail costs are zero, and therefore that net mark-
ups are equal to gross mark-ups. We do not have any information on the variable
retail costs other than wholesale costs. Assuming that most retail costs are xed
seems plausible, as Schaumans and Verboven (2008) suggest, because retail costs
are mostly labor costs, and time spent on servicing patients is essentially xed
during opening hours. Although, as these authors point out, it would not be
di¢ cult to consider net mark-ups () as being smaller than gross mark-ups (),
and to estimate the corresponding reduction in gross mark-ups of a drop in net
mark-ups as it is equal to [(1  )=(1  )](  1).
5. Estimation and results
We examine the entry of pharmacies at the municipal level, which here we consider
as constituting the local market for pharmaceutical services. Following Schaumans
and Verboven (2008), we select municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants
and those whose density of population is less than 800 inhabitants per square
kilometer. By doing so, we focus our attention on what can be assumed to be
relatively isolated markets since pharmaceutical services are overwhelmingly local
by nature. We gathered data for Navarra before and after deregulation (2000 and
2006), and for the entry restricted regions of Euskadi in 2006 and Andalusia in
2008.17
For each municipality we gathered data regarding the number of pharmacies as
well as for a set of drivers of entry including population headcounts, the number
of public health centers, population density, the percentage of population under
17Our experimental setting enabled us to test as to whether the denition of the municipal-
ities as the relevant markets was correct as we were able to check whether the free opening of
pharmacies in Navarra had any signicant e¤ect on the payo¤ functions of the municipalities
across the border in Euskadi. We did not nd any cross border signicant e¤ect, and therefore
municipality boundaries place an upper limit to the relevant markets.
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the age of 14 and the percentage over the age of 75 (in order to be sure to include
those with the greatest needs in terms of health-care assistance), educational
attainment, and unemployment.18
< Insert table1 around here >
From the statistics in Table 1 we can observe that removing entry restrictions
in Navarra doubled the mean number of pharmacies per municipality, but that the
drivers of entry in the region remained largely constant before and after deregula-
tion. On average, municipalities are larger in Andalusia than in Euskadi, while the
municipalities of these two regions are in turn larger than those in Navarra. The
mean number of pharmacies in Euskadi, where entry restrictions are operative,
is similar to that in Navarra following entry deregulation. The mean number of
pharmacies in Andalusia under market entry restrictions is, however, larger even
than that in Navarra after deregulation.
Table 2 shows the market structures in the four region-year pair samples,
in the combined sample containing the three regulated region-years, and in the
pooled sample. The mass of the density distribution lies within the 0 and 1
pharmacies per municipality. This is particularly true for Navarra in 2000 when
entry was rst restricted. Deregulation caused a large proportion of the mass of
the density function in Navarra to shift towards 2, 3 and 4 or more pharmacies
per municipality. The regulatory policy of allowing the rst pharmacy free entry
in each town in Andalusia has achieved the aim of ensuring that virtually no
municipality is without a pharmacy. Most municipalities have just one pharmacy.
<Insert table 2 around here>
Table 3 shows how tough regulations were in the three regions. Entry restric-
tions were almost always binding in Navarra in 2000. The 3% of municipalities
with two pharmacies were all restricted to having at maximum those two phar-
macies. By contrast, in Euskadi in 2006 we observe that there were a substantial
number of markets in which the regulations allowed two or three pharmacies to
operate but numbers were lower than this entry cap. In Euskadi in 2006, entry
18Data on the number of pharmacies are drawn from the regional governments, data on health
care facilities, and data on demographics at the municipal level are from the Spanish Statistical
O¢ ce. Using population under 16 and over 65 do not alter the results.
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restrictions were always binding for municipalities with four or more pharmacies.
In Andalusia in 2008, there were no constraints placed on opening the rst phar-
macy, and there were always some municipalities in which the maximum number
of pharmacies was not binding. However, the one, two and three pharmacy entry
restrictions were binding more often in Andalusia than in Euskadi. By contrast,
the four or more pharmacy cap was found to be binding more often in Euskadi
than it was in Andalusia.
<Insert table 3 around here>
It should not be forgotten that the location of new entrants was constrained
before and after the entry decision was deregulated. In Navarra in 2000, Euskadi
in 2006 and Andalusia in 2008, new pharmacies had to be located at a distance of
250 meters from incumbents in the market. In Navarra in 2006, new pharmacies
had to be located 150 meters from existing businesses.
Table 4 shows the results when estimating the entry model using the entry
restricted data and the free entry data separately. As outlined above, we use the
log of population of each municipality as a measure of market size (S). Population
was found to be a very good entry driver in the Spanish market where almost all
medicine prices and mark-ups are set by the government.
To allow for di¤erences in the pharmacies protability per headcount, we added
the extra market characteristics: the number of public health centers in each mu-
nicipality, population density, the percentage of young people in the municipality,
the percentage of old citizens, education and the unemployment rate. However, in
both entry restricted and free entry scenarios, the drivers of protability per head
did not seem to have any statistically signicant impact. This is probably due to
the e¤ect of the regulation of medicine price and public sector intervention, which
means that any di¤erences in protability per head across markets are very small.
Table 4 shows that the constant term (0) and the population parameter ()
appear to di¤er between the free-entry and entry-restricted samples suggesting
that there are signicant di¤erences across regulation settings. Our data do not
allow us to identify time xed e¤ects, but there have been no changes in mark-up
regulations or in other payo¤ relevant observables to suggest the need to include
any year specic impact.
<Insert table 4 around here>
Estimating the entry model for the pooled sample allows us to test whether
deregulation changes the payo¤ function of the entry model. Table 5 shows the
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results of estimating the parameters of the payo¤function combining the data from
entry restricted and free entry region-years. The rst panel shows the estimates
using the data for entry-restricted Euskadi in 2006, and before and after data for
Navarra in 2000 and 2006. The second panel shows the estimates using the data
for entry-restricted Andalusia in 2008 and before and after data for Navarra in
2000 and 2006.
To keep the model parsimonious we did not include the payo¤ drivers that
were found not to be statistically signicant. We included a regional xed e¤ect
to separate out the di¤erences in the mean payo¤s in Euskadi and Andalusia with
respect to those in Navarra (Nav0 ), and we also allowed regional di¤erences in the
coe¢ cient measuring the impact of population on payo¤s (Nav) . We also allowed
the competition e¤ects (j) to be di¤erent in the free entry and restricted entry
region-years. By so doing, we allowed for di¤erences in the competition e¤ects
after deregulation. These e¤ects measure the change in competition when there
is a new entry.
A likelihood ratio test showed that the unrestricted model allowing for di¤er-
ences in the competition e¤ect is preferred to a model in which the competition
e¤ects are common in the case of free entry and restricted entry.
We also estimated a model in which we allowed the constant (0) and the
coe¢ cient of population () to be also di¤erent in the free entry region-year
( = f : Navarra 2006) with respect to the restricted entry region-years ( = r :
Navarra 2000, Euskadi 2006 and Andalusia 2008). However, we show the estimates
of a constrained model in which we did not include these parameters because the
log likelihood ratio test allowed us to keep to the more parsimonious specication.
<Insert table 5 around here>
The regional e¤ects are not statistically signicant, although they are impor-
tant in avoiding any bias in assessing the e¤ect of deregulation. Navarra has a
positive xed e¤ect but a negative interaction term with population with respect
to Euskadi. Navarra has a negative e¤ect and a negative interaction term with
population with respect to Andalusia. Given the magnitude of the regional e¤ects,
this means that the threshold for the rst entrant is smaller in Navarra than it is
in Euskadi, but larger in Navarra than in Andalusia.19
19Solving for S1 such that (
 + Nav) lnS + 0 + 
Nav > 0 shows that the rst pharmacy
population threshold for Navarra is S1;Nav = exp(
 0 Nav
+Nav
); while for the other regions is
S1 = exp(
 0

):
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The competition e¤ects are slightly stronger in the restricted entry case, than
in the free entry case as 2r > 
2
f ; 
3
r > 
3
f and 
4
r > 
4
f : The second pharmacy
steals much more business from the incumbent when entry is restricted than when
it is free (2r > 
2
f ). This is an unexpected result, as we expected to have smaller
business-stealing e¤ects when distance regulations imposed larger distances: 250
meters in entry restricted region-years rather than 150 meters in the free entry
case. However, anecdotal evidence shows that the distance between the pharma-
cies that are closer to a health center is quite similar across regions and across
regulation scenarios. Thus, if distance is not signicantly di¤erent, the conduct
appears to be more competitive in the case of entry restricted settings.
By contrast, the business stealing e¤ect of the third and fourth pharmacies
is smaller when entry is restricted than when it is free as 3r   2r < 3f   2f ;
and 4r   3r < 4f   3f : This result was expected as mean distance between
pharmacies might be smaller in the free entry case. If distance is not signicantly
di¤erent across regions nor across regulation settings, conduct proves to be more
competitive in the free entry scenario for the third and further pharmacies.
6. Policy counterfactuals
Once we have the estimates of the entry models, we can then use them to simulate
policy counterfactuals regarding the reform of entry restrictions, the mark-up reg-
ulations or both. Furthermore, these counterfactuals will reveal the distribution
of the the regulatory rents and this should shed light on the rationale guiding the
regulatory policy.
Table 6 shows the di¤erent nature of the deregulation predictions for Euskadi
and Andalusia in the di¤erent estimated entry models. If we follow Schaumans
and Verboven (2008) and compute the number of pharmacies by removing the
entry restrictions from those estimates that do not take into account the change
in the business stealing e¤ects in the payo¤ function due to deregulation, we
see that regulation restricted entry by 26% in Euskadi in 2006 and by 47% in
Andalusia in 2008. In this counterfactual, the parameters of the payo¤ function
are kept constant before and after the entry restrictions have been lifted. This then
constitutes our best prediction when exclusively using the structural entry model
approach without data from the policy experiment. The estimate for Andalusia
in 2008 is quite similar to the 50% reduction in the number of pharmacies caused
by regulation obtained by Schaumans and Verboven (2008) for Belgium. The
estimate for Euskadi, however, is roughly half that.
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These estimates prove to be downward biased. If we allow the parameters
of the payo¤ function to change in the free entry counterfactual, the impact of
entry restrictions increase almost by half. Regulation restricted entry by 36% in
Euskadi in 2006 and by 71% in Andalusia in 2008.
Table 7 shows, by contrast, that counterfactuals about the number of markets
that remain without a pharmacy before and after deregulation are almost identical
both when using the exclusively structural model and when combining it with the
experimental data. This is because we only allow the di¤erences in payo¤s to be
driven by di¤erences in the competition e¤ects. Small di¤erences would appear if
we had used a model including not only di¤erential competition e¤ects, but also
di¤erences in the constant term (regulation xed e¤ect) and in the market size
e¤ects.
<Insert tables 6 & 7 around here>
Table 8 shows that markets with a larger population are able to support more
pharmacies. However, what is striking is the extent to which market thresholds
di¤er in the restricted-entry and free-entry counterfactuals. In the case of Euskadi
in 2006, the second and third thresholds are smaller in the free-entry counterfac-
tual than in the restricted entry setting. By contrast, the rst and the fourth
thresholds do not di¤er in the entry restricted setting and the free-entry coun-
terfactual. This is because the e¤ect of having one competitor on the incumbent
monopolist payo¤s is greater in case of restricted entry than it is in that of free
entry.
In the case of Andalusia in 2008, table 9 shows that all thresholds but the
rst are much smaller in the free-entry counterfactual. The e¤ect of having one
competitor on the incumbent monopolist payo¤s is much larger when entry is
restricted than when entry is free. Such di¤erences reect a change in the payo¤s
function and the equilibrium outcome of the model. Regulation does not only
restrict entry, but it also changes the nature of the strategic interaction between
competitors.
<Insert tables 8 & 9 around here>
The estimated thresholds are also informative about the change in competition
in response to entry. In the free-entry counterfactuals, the estimates suggest a
pattern of increasing competition in response to entry. The market threshold
to support any given number of pharmacies increases more than proportionally:
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the mean per-rm threshold always increases with the number of pharmacies.
Similarly, the last rm threshold increases with the number of pharmacies.
This suggests that pharmacies do use costly non-price instruments such as
quality of service (more counseling, longing opening hours, etc.) in response to
additional entry, and in order to support such competition e¤orts larger per rm
markets are required to survive.20
By contrast, the market threshold for supporting any given number of phar-
macies increases more than proportionally from a monopolistic to a duopolistic
situation, but less than proportionally from a duopoly upwards. This suggests
that incumbents also use costly non-price instruments, such as quality of service,
in response to the entry of a second competitor. Many incumbent pharmacies
located near the main health centers in downtowns are the ones that tend to
be larger and open 24 hours. However, duopolists may even reduce the use of
such competitive reactions to the threat of entry from a third pharmacy, thereby
decreasing the per rm threshold.
Finally, we can estimate how much the regulated mark-up needs to be re-
duced by in order to t the counterfactual payo¤s to the current payo¤s, and
consequently to t the current distribution of pharmacies in the free entry coun-
terfactual. Table 10 shows that the mean reduction in the net mark-up would have
to be a factor of 0.86 in Euskadi and 0.29 in Andalusia in order that all munic-
ipalities keep the number of pharmacies at the current restricted entry number.
This is a reduction of 3.9% in Euskadi and 19.8% in Andalusia on the current
gross mark-up of 27.9%, assuming that net mark-ups equal gross mark-ups, and
of 2.2% in Euskadi and 11.2% in Andalusia assuming that net mark-ups equal
gross mark-ups minus 10% variable costs.
<Insert table 10 around here>
This is also a measure of regulatory rents and their distribution. The distri-
bution of these rents is highly skewed in Euskadi. The 90th percentile records a
24.8% excess mark-up and the 75th percentile a 4.5% excess mark-up, while the
rest do not record any excess. Excess mark-ups are large in municipalities with
one, three and four or more pharmacies (7.8%, 8.8% and 14.2% respectively). By
contrast, competitive interaction makes the duopolist worse o¤ under regulated
20This result di¤ers from Schaumans and Verbovens (2008) ndings for Belgium where there
are no location constraints, and market thresholds roughly increase in proportion with the
number of pharmacies.
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entry, they record mark-ups that are 8.2% smaller than they would be under free
entry.
In Andalusia, all pharmacies record large excess mark-ups (median is 24.8%),
with the 10th percentile recording none and the better o¤ monopolies obtaining
excess mark-ups of 21.3%.
7. Conclusions
Entry regulations have a strong impact both on the payo¤s of incumbent phar-
macies and on the actual number of new pharmacies across municipalities. The
policy experiment of freeing entry in certain regions of Spain, including Navarra,
has presented us with a laboratory in which we have been able to design a struc-
tural model of entry with experimental data. By comparing the impact of the free
entry policy adopted in Navarra with the results obtained in other parts of Spain
where entry is severely restricted, namely neighboring Euskadi and the highly-
populated Andalusia, we have been able to predict a but-for scenario in the
event of the liberalization of entry and when adjusting regulated mark-ups.
Here, when computing the counterfactuals it became apparent just how im-
portant it is to allow for a changing payo¤ function since regulation does not
only restrict entry, but it also changes the conduct of pharmacies in the market
place dramatically. Regulation means that pharmacies grow to much larger di-
mensions, allowing them to serve more inhabitants per outlet, and to react more
aggressively through the use of non-price instruments, particularly when the in-
cumbents monopoly is threatened by a second entrant.
Further, it is apparent that the specic nature of the entry restrictions and the
distribution of population in the territory can shape the distribution of regulatory
rents. In Euskadi, where entry restrictions apply even to small towns and popu-
lation is sparsely located in a continuum of small settlements, payo¤s are boosted
for what is a rather small number of incumbents, which are typically not those
located in the regions smallest towns.
Contrary to the argument that the policy aims to serve public interests, regula-
tion does not boost the payo¤s of the pharmacies in the smallest towns. Nor does
it increase the payo¤s of all pharmacies at the same rate. The gains from these
regulations are very unevenly distributed, suggesting that there are private inter-
ests involved in the shaping of the current mix of entry and mark-up regulations.
The rising tide of regulation does not lift all boats.
Moreover, entry and mark-up regulations do not serve the public interest of
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promoting better access to retail pharmacy services. In the case of Euskadi,
where entry is restricted even in small towns, the regulation leaves almost 40% of
all municipalities without pharmacies. By contrast, the free entry counterfactual
leaves only 30% without a pharmacy.
In Andalusia, where entry regulations do not restrict the entry of the rst
pharmacy and the regions population tends to be located to a greater extent
in larger towns, payo¤s are boosted more evenly. In closer keeping with public
interest rationales, monopolist payo¤s are those that tend to obtain most support,
while most incumbents, with a few exceptions, obtain excess mark-ups. However,
the costs of these entry restrictions for the taxpayer are higher in Andalusia than
comparable rates in Euskadi.
Finally, the policy experiment illustrates that the key instrument for improving
pharmaceutical service coverage across municipalities and for securing quasi-rents
for public services jointly delivered with private services is neither entry regula-
tions nor xed percentage mark-ups.
Increasing access to retail pharmacy services across municipalities and secur-
ing uniform quasi-rents requires a program that raises prots in a non linear
manner, o¤ering larger mark-ups to those pharmacies operating in less populated
municipalities, while capping the mark-ups of pharmacies in more populated mu-
nicipalities. But non-uniform mark-ups, such as those paid by the NHS in the
UK, are proving very di¢ cult to design in countries with stringent regulations in
their retail pharmaceutical services.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable Description
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
# pharmacies Number of pharmacies 0.56 0.63 0.96 1.14 1.56 1.12 1.03 1.50
population Number of inhabitants 951.86 1,385.25 2,325.19 3,100.00 3,256.01 3,250.62 1,033.31 1,556.10
# health centers Number of health centers 1.13 1.04 0.94 0.61 1.51 1.13 1.14 1.04
density Inhabitants per square kilometers 36.45 71.45 125.74 165.15 64.92 102.27 37.68 67.74
%young Fraction of population, 14 years and younger 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.10 0.05
%old Fraction of population, 75 years and older 0.13 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.14 0.06
education Educational attainment 2.81 0.17 2.92 0.15 1.80 0.16 2.80 0.17
%unemployment Unemployment rate 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.30 0.15 0.08 0.05
Navarra 2000 Andalusia 2008 Navarra 2006
Entry-restricted
Euskadi 2006
Free-entry
(#markets=263) (#markets=207) (#markets=654) (#markets=258)
 
 
 
 
Free-entry
Entry-restricted 
and free-entry
A B C A & B & C D A, B, C & D
#pharmacies
Navarra 
2000
Euskadi 
2006
Andalusia 
2008
All 
restricted Navarra 2006 All
0 49% 38% 1% 44% 47% 24%
1 48% 46% 70% 47% 31% 55%
2 3% 8% 15% 5% 10% 11%
3 - 3% 7% 2% 7% 5%
4+ - 5% 7% 3% 5% 5%
Table 2.- Market structures
Entry-restricted
 
 
 
Entry-restricted and 
free-entry
A B C A, B & C A, B, C & D
# pharmacies
Navarra 
2000
Euskadi 
2006
Andalusia 
2008 All restricted All
0 99% 89% 0% 92% 59%
1 99% 92% 96% 96% 86%
2 100% 81% 88% 88% 72%
3 - 86% 91% 90% 66%
4+ - 100% 84% 87% 71%
Table 3.- Binding entry restrictions
Entry-restricted
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4. Estimation results
Coeff. (Std. Err.) t-stat Coeff. (Std. Err.) t-stat
constant β 0 -5.48 (1.52) 3.60 -9.55 (1.02) 9.33
ln (population) λ 1.44 (0.23) 6.31 1.67 (0.17) 9.77
# health centers β 1 0.09 (0.83) 0.11 0.08 (0.63) 0.13
density β 2 -0.0003 (0.01) 0.03 0.004 (0.01) 0.39
%young β 3 -6.12 (11.54) 0.53 -3.66 (8.73) 0.42
%old β 4 -2.081 (12.27) 0.17 2.29 (7.39) 0.31
education β 5 -0.67 (0.65) 1.03 -0.16 (0.36) 0.43
%unemployment β 6 0.71 (5.84) 0.12 1.96 (13.07) 0.15
α 2 4.27 (1.68) 2.54 2.46 (1.28) 1.92
α 3 4.62 (1.61) 2.87 3.60 (1.78) 2.02
α 4 4.83 (2.12) 2.28 4.63 (2.24) 2.06
Log likelihood
# markets
* Censored ordered probit model to account for entry restrictions
** Uncensored ordered probit model as entry is free
1124 258
The other estimates αj, j = 5, …, 12 are not shown. Constrains on those estimates are 
discussed in the text.
Entry restricted: Navarra 
2000, Euskadi 2006 & 
Andalusia 2008* Free entry: Navarra 2006**
-410.94 -210.44
 
 
  
Coeff. (St. Er.) t-stat Coeff. (St. Er.) t-stat
constant β 0 -9.11 (1.15) 7.94 -6.43 (1.25) 5.14
ln (population) λ 1.49 (0.21) 7.26 1.33 (0.22) 6.18
navarra β 0
Nav 0.57 (1.32) 0.43 -0.73 (1.66) 0.44
navarra * ln(population) λ Nav -0.01 (0.21) 0.05 -0.05 (0.26) 0.20
α f
2 2.24 (2.04) 1.10 2.18 (2.53) 0.86
α f
3 3.21 (2.71) 1.19 3.09 (3.36) 0.92
α f
4 4.12 (3.62) 1.14 4.08 (4.62) 0.88
α r
2 3.64 (2.56) 1.42 4.45 (1.71) 2.61
α r
3 3.95 (2.53) 1.56 4.74 (1.43) 3.32
α r
4 4.12 (3.18) 1.29 4.89 (1.77) 2.76
Log likelihood
# markets
Censored ordered probit models to account for 
entry restrictions
The other estimates α f
j , j = 5, …, 12 and αr
j, j = 5, …, 8 are not shown. Constrains on those 
estimates are discussed in the text.
Table 5. Estimation results
-513.14
1175
Navarra 2000 & 2006, 
Euskadi 2006
-387.95
728
Navarra 2000 & 2006, 
Andalusia 2008
 
 
 
Euskadi Andalusia
A.- # pharmacies: entry restricted best prediction 210 969
B.- # pharmacies: free entry and constant payoffs counterfactual 282 1817
C.- # pharmacies: free entry & changing payoffs counterfactual 327 3305
(A-B)/B: entry restriction relative impact -26% -47%
(A-C)/C: entry restriction relative impact -36% -71%
Table 6. Entry restriction impact on the number of pharmacies: counterfactuals
 
 
 
Euskadi Andalusia
A.- # markets: entry restricted best prediction 76 2
B.- # markets: free entry and constant payoffs counterfactual 56 2
C.- # markets free entry & changing payoffs counterfactual 56 1
(A-B)/B: entry restriction relative impact 36% 0%
(A-C)/C: entry restriction relative impact 36% 100%
Table 7. Entry restriction impact on the number of markets with no pharmacies
 
Entry-restricted
N
Market 
Threshold
 Per-firm 
Threshold
Last firm 
Threshold
1 566 566 566
2 6513 3257 5947
3 8020 2673 1506
4 8989 2247 969
Free-entry counterfactual
N
Market 
Threshold
Per-firm 
Threshold
Last firm 
Threshold
1 566 566 566
2 2545 1273 1979
3 4880 1627 2335
4 8989 2247 4108
Table 8.- Entry Thresholds in Euskadi 2006
 
 
 
 
 
Entry-restricted
N
Market 
Threshold
 Per-firm 
Threshold
Last firm 
Threshold
1 167 167 167
2 4732 2366 4566
3 5885 1962 1153
4 6588 1647 703
Free-entry counterfactual
N
Market 
Threshold
 Per-firm 
Threshold
Last firm 
Threshold
1 167 218 167
2 859 429 692
3 1702 567 843
4 3583 896 1881
Table 9.- Entry Thresholds in Andalusia 2008
 
 
 
 
Table 10.- Policy reform: change in markups to make restricted entry payoffs equal to free-entry payoffs
Euskadi Andalusia Euskadi Andalusia Euzkadi Andalusia
mean 0.86 0.29 -3.9% -19.8% -2.2% -11.2%
90th percentile 0.11 0.01 -24.8% -27.6% -14.0% -15.6%
75th percentile 0.84 0.02 -4.5% -27.3% -2.5% -15.4%
median 1.00 0.11 0.0% -24.8% 0.0% -14.0%
25th percentile 1.00 0.39 0.0% -17.0% 0.0% -9.6%
10th percentile 1.00 1.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
mean if #pharmacies==0 1.00 1.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
mean if #pharmacies==1 0.72 0.24 -7.8% -21.3% -4.4% -12.0%
mean if #pharmacies==2 1.30 0.47 8.2% -14.9% 4.6% -8.4%
mean if #pharmacies==3 0.69 0.40 -8.8% -16.7% -4.9% -9.4%
mean if #pharmacies==4+ 0.49 0.52 -14.2% -13.4% -8.0% -7.5%
Absolute gross markup drop
Mean net markup drop by 
factor ∆
net markups == gross 
markups
net markups= gross 
markups -10%
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